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very deception practiced by the prosecutor has fooled
and misled the Defendant, but the trial court as well!
It is for this purpose

namely, that a "bill of

particulars" forces the prosecutor to focus in and
precisely identify specific facts, etc., necessary to
the successful charging and conviction of an alleged
offense

that the bill of particulars was requested!

The prosecution, having filed such a VAGUE and
proven-AMBIGUOUS

information

as was herein

filed,

cannot be rewarded for having misled the Defendant and,
implicitly, misled the Court!
In this case, the Defendant's contention is NOT
what he did. The Defendant knows exactly what he did.
The request for the bill of particulars is significant
because it forces the prosecution
offense AND

(1) to allege an

(2) to prove that offense. That didn't

happen here.
The incongruous result shown by Judge Boyden's
verdict was certainly not anticipated; a better-pleaded
Information

(or the requested bill of particulars)

would have had a different result!
The "abuse of discretion" standard for appellate
review of the trial judge's decision

(to deny the

sought-for "bill of particulars") should be applied
where the trial judge is in full possession of all of
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the facts. Where, however, as in this case THE TRIAL
JUDGE WAS NOT SO FULLY INFORMED, BUT WAS SIMILARLY A
VICTIM OF THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO PRECISELY PLEAD
THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT,

the

standard

should be different.
The Appellant's Brief cites to State vs Bell, 770
P.2d

100

(Utah Supreme Court 1988),

and State vs

Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-21 (Utah 1987), holding that
in cases such as this the burden should be "shifted" to
the prosecutor to justify the prosecutor's actions. The
Appellee's Brief is fatally lacking in any response to
the requirements imposed by the holdings of Bell and
Knight!
The Appellant has clearly shown the outcome of the
case would have been different and that the appellate
court's "confidence in the outcome has been eroded" and
that a reversal of the conviction should be entered.
The prosecution HAS NOT shouldered or met the
"burden shifting" requirement placed upon it!
The

Court

of

Appeals

should

reverse

the

convictions, order the creation and service of a bill
of particulars, and remand the case for a jury trial.
II
THE "JURY TRIAL" ISSUES
The problem with approaching the denial of the
5

"jury trial"
trial

court's

as demanded and AS SCHEDULED, per the
own

order

is

not

merely

for

"sentencing" (ala six months or less incarceration),
but for the Defendant's "constitutional right" to have
a jury determine his guilt or innocence! [This case is
further exacerbated by the fact that had a jury been
empaneled, the incongruous "verdicts" found by the
trial court may not have happened at all, due to the
more

precise

nature

of

the

prosecution's

theory

of

instructions

and the Defendant's response thereto!]

the

presentation
case

of

through

the
jury

Whether jail time is imposed (or available) is not
necessarily the only issue when dealing with this most
fundamental "constitutional right".
The undersigned believes that the decision of the
Court of Appeals in West Valley City vs McDonald, 94 8
P.2d 371 (Utah Court of Appeals 1997), is misplaced,
jurisprudentially, in this case, for the following
reason: McDonald involved a defendant charged with a
minor traffic offense

prosecuted as an "infraction",

for which statutorily there could be no possibility
whatsoever of any incarceration! [As noted previously,
much of what was stated in the McDonald decision might
merely be dicta.] To have the trial judge "order"
(August 20, 1998, as the "docket history" shows: see
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ADDENDUM #5 in Appellant's Brief] the case be set for
"jury

trial"

therefor) , and

(in

response

to

Defendant's

then, ON THE MORNING

demand

THE CASE IS

SCHEDULED FOR TRIAL, order that the case will proceed
without a jury (because no jury had been called) is an
"abuse of discretion". For the trial court to announce
that "no jail will be imposed if I find you guilty" is
not the proper way to do things. Such a cavalier method
is certainly not very "judicial".
The significant jurisprudential principles behind
McDonald should be re-examined! The McDonald "holding"
(sic) should be reversed or at least narrowed!
Ill
"SINGLE-CRIMINAL EPISODE" PROVISIONS PRECLUDE
CONVICTION OF BOTH OFFENSES
Appellee's

counsel

superficially

explains

the

particular factual and legal theory upon which he
believes

appellate counsel was NOT the trial counsel-

--the case was tried. Unfortunately, that explanation
relies heavily upon the judge's announced verdict (as
explained at the sentencing hearing). The explanation
ignores,

however,

the

factual

and

legal

issues

associated with the charged offenses and the claimed
proof thereof.
The prosecution believes that the "15 minute" time
differential between the two offenses interrupts the
•'
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•

"single criminal episode" and makes it two offenses.
That's not true.
Both actions

or series of actions

had to be

related, in time and geographic proximity, to each
other. The "photos offense" had to be related to the
"telephone books offense", for without the taking of
the telephone books there could be no offense.
Similarly, the statute expressly provides that a
person shall not be convicted of the

"substantive

offense" and of an "attempt" when the same arises from
a

"single

criminal

episode".

The

prosecution

especially when the prosecution so intentionally and
consistently "stonewalled" the Defendant on the soughtfor bill of particulars to specifically identify the
specific property alleged to have been taken as relates
to each specific charge

ought not to be allowed to

now compartmentalize the charges and with "stopwatch
accuracy" plead that one offense (i.e. the "theft by
deception"

of the photographs, which was NOT the

offense the prosecution set out to prove) was committed
and fully consummated minutes before the second offense
(i.e. that of "attempted theft" of the telephone books)
was committed and consummated.
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IV
THE "THEFT BY DECEPTION" VERDICT CANNOT STAND
The prosecution claims the "theft by deception"
charge is supported by the evidence and conforms to the
statute. [The Defendant-Appellant again points out this
is NOT the charge (i.e. related to the photographs) the
prosecution set out to prove at trial!]
The appellate counsel for the City ignores two
things. First, that "theft by deception" requires an
"economic" aspect of the crime. The statute says so!
The law should not presume
counsel seems to suggest

as the City's appellate
that if a citizen asks to

inspect a public record and is handed the file, there
is a "deception" which occurs if the citizen fails to
give back the entire file (or opens the file and/or
removes

for convenience in examining the individual

documents within that file

some of those documents

from the actual confines of the physical file.
Secondly, the witness who gave Mr Decker the file
testified that she was NOT deceived.
Utah law requires that there be "reliance" in
"theft by deception" cases. In State vs Jones, 657 P. 2d
1263 (Utah Supreme Court 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
wrote:
It is clear from the face of the statute
that reliance by the victim is an element of
9

the crime of theft by deception. In context,
obtaining property "by deception" can only
mean "by means of deception." Deception,
followed by transfer of property to the
deceiver, does not add up to theft by
deception without the causal element of
reliance. Even though the alleged victim is
deceived, if he does not rely on the deception
in parting with his property, there has been
no theft "by deception". State v. Vatsis, 10
Utah 2d 244, 246-47. 351 P.2d 96, 97-98 (1960)
(involving statutory predecessor of §76-6405(1), which also contained no express
reference to "reliance"); State v. Finch, 223
Kan. 398, 573 P.2d 1048 (1978).
657 P.2d at 1267. Emphasis added.
When the prosecution's own witness testifies that
there was "no deception", the trial court's finding is
not supported by the evidence. The conviction cannot
stand!
CONCLUSION
The Defendant has been unfairly prejudiced by the
prosecutor's repeated failure to provide the "bill of
particulars", specifically describing the items of
property alleged to have been stolen or attempted to
have

been

Defendant

stolen.

This

failure

resulted

in

the

misled by the "open file" disclosure as to

the prosecutor's theory

defending against charges

exactly opposite of what the trial court judge found
him guilty of!
The Defendant has made a "credible argument" that
the pre-trial discovery disclosure (i.e. access to the
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prosecution's

"screening

worksheet")

improperly

distracted the Defendant and his counsel from the
"theory of guilt" of the charged offenses actually
accepted by the trial judge. The prosecuting attorney
has not met the "shifted burden" requirements imposed
upon

him

of

convincing

the

appellate

court

was

"harmless error". Bell, supra, and Knight, supra.
The trial court's refusal to grant the timelydemanded "jury trial", for these serious misdemeanor
offenses, is unjustified. The Rules do not require the
Defendant to "reconfirm" his "demand". The McDonald
decision is inappropriate to this factual situation
and/or should be more carefully revisited, by this case
which does present the constitutional question properly
and by

a party

who has

standing

to assert

that

constitutional question.
The "dual" convictions (i.e. of both offenses) is
clearly precluded by the "single criminal episode"
statute. Furthermore, the status of the confusing
evidence is such that the trial court's own findings
evidence

the

prosecution's

failure

to

prove

the

accused's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt".
The Defendant's conviction of both offenses should
be set aside. The case should be remanded to the
District

Court

for

a

jury
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trial,

following

the

providing of a "bill of particulars'* identifying the
property in question. In the alternative, the charges
should

be

dismissed,

outright,

as

the

prosecution

simply failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of September,
1999.
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